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 NOTES 
The Latest NFL Fumble: Using its 
Commissioner as the Sole Arbitrator 
State ex rel. Hewitt v. Kerr, 461 S.W.3d 798 (Mo. 2015). 
THERESA MULLINEAUX* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Professional football is the most popular sport within the United States.1 Dom-
inating television, the last Super Bowl XLVIII, the annual championship game, was 
the most watched television show in U.S. history.2  The National Football League 
(NFL) is the governing body of professional football in America and is led by Com-
missioner Roger Goodell who acts as the chief executive of the NFL overseeing all 
32 NFL teams. Amongst his vast powers includes resolving disputes with “full, 
complete, and final jurisdiction to arbitrate any dispute between any player, coach, 
and/or other employee of any member of the League (or any combination thereof) 
and any member club or clubs.”3  The Commissioner’s ability to make binding de-
cisions in these disputes is diminished by a clear conflict of interest. This must be 
changed. 
In 2013, Todd Hewitt, a former employee of the St. Louis Rams, sought a writ 
of mandamus requesting the Twenty-First Judicial Circuit in St. Louis County, Mis-
souri, vacate an order compelling arbitration of his age discrimination claim against 
the St. Louis Rams and three of its affiliates.  The trial court granted the Rams’ 
motion to compel arbitration, and ordered the court action be stayed pending the 
arbitration.  After an unsuccessful attempt at an appeal, Hewitt received a prelimi-
nary order in mandamus from the Eastern District of the Missouri Court of Appeals.  
On transfer from the court of appeals, the Missouri Supreme Court issued a writ of 
mandamus and reviewed Hewitt’s case for error. 
The Missouri Supreme Court found that having the NFL Commissioner serve 
as the mandatory arbitrator for any claim against the NFL was unconscionable, as 
                                                          
* B.S. University of Missouri 2014, J.D., University of Missouri 2017. I would like to thank the edi-
torial staff of the Journal of Dispute Resolution and my advisor Professor Robert Bailey for the time 
spent helping edit this Note. I would also like to thank my father and grandpa for teaching me about 
football and for the pleasure of watching the Rams with them every Sunday. 
 1. Darren Rovell, NFL Most Popular for 30th year in row, ESPN (Jan. 26, 2014), 
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/10354114/harris-poll-nfl-most-popular-mlb-2nd. 
 2. John Breech, Super Bowl 49 watched by 114.4M, sets U.S. TV viewership record, CBS SPORTS, 
(Feb. 2, 2015 5:26pm ET), http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/eye-on-football/25019076/super-bowl-49-
watched-by-1144m-sets-us-tv-viewership-record. 
 3. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS, NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE 28 
(2006), http://www.nfl.com/static/content/public/static/html/careers/pdf/co_.pdf [hereinafter NFL 
CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS]. 
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the Commissioner is inherently biased.  The NFL Commissioner is inherently bi-
ased as he receives his salary from team owners, and the team owners also adopt 
the rules and regulations under which he operates.  Furthermore, these same owners 
will eventually consider renewing or terminating the Commissioner’s contract.  The 
court inferred the specific terms of arbitration from applicable statutes in Missouri’s 
Uniform Arbitration Act and directed the parties to proceed with a neutral arbitra-
tor.4 
The Missouri Supreme Court was correct to determine the Commissioner 
should not act as an arbitrator for these claims.  This Note will analyze the Com-
missioner’s bias, explore how other professional sport leagues handle arbitration 
claims, and provide future recommendations for NFL players and employees. 
II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
The St. Louis Rams is a NFL team located in St. Louis, Missouri.5  Todd Hewitt 
started with the team during college as a summer equipment department employee.6  
He joined the organization as a full-time employee in 1978 and became the equip-
ment manager in 1985.7  He held the position until early 2011.8 
During his tenure with the St. Louis Rams, Hewitt signed a number of employ-
ment contracts with the organization.9  In November 2008, Hewitt signed his final 
contract with the Rams covering both the 2009 to 2010 and 2010 to 2011 football 
seasons.10  The contract contained an arbitration clause binding Hewitt to the Con-
stitution and By–Laws and Rules and Regulations of the NFL and by the decisions 
of the NFL Commissioner if a dispute arose as the Commissioner is granted “full, 
complete, and final jurisdiction and authority to arbitrate” through the Constitution 
and By-Laws.11 
In January 2011, head coach Steve Spagnuolo informed 54-year-old Hewitt 
that the organization would not renew his employment contract.12  In May 2012, 
Hewitt filed suit in the Twenty-First Judicial Circuit in St. Louis County, Missouri, 
against the St. Louis Rams Partnership and three affiliated companies — The Rams 
Football Company, Inc., ITB Football Company, L.L.C., and The St. Louis Rams, 
L.L.C. (collectively the Rams) — asserting age discrimination claims in violation 
of the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA), section 213.010 et seq.13 
The defendants moved to compel arbitration and dismiss or stay the court pro-
ceedings, citing the arbitration provision in Hewitt’s employment contract.14  
Hewitt opposed arbitration for five reasons.15  First, three of the four defendants did 
not sign the agreement.16  Second, the parties came to no meeting of the minds as 
                                                          
 4. State ex rel. Hewitt v. Kerr, 461 S.W.3d 798, 803 (Mo. 2015) (en banc). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Hewitt, 461 S.W.3d at 803. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 803- 804. 
 12. Id. at 804. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Hewitt, 461 S.W.3d at 804. 
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to the essential terms of the arbitration agreement.17  Third, the arbitration agree-
ment lacked consideration.18  Fourth, the agreement did not contain a clear and un-
mistakable waiver of Hewitt’s right to bring a statutory violation claim in court.19 
Fifth, Hewitt claimed several provisions of the arbitration agreement were uncon-
scionable, including the provision naming the NFL Commissioner as the arbitra-
tor.20 
The Rams’ motion to compel arbitration was granted by the trial court with the 
action to be stayed pending the arbitration.21  Upon the rejection of an appeal, 
Hewitt petitioned the Missouri Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus or prohi-
bition which issued a preliminary order in mandamus.22  Both parties sought and 
were granted transfer to the Missouri Supreme Court, and Hewitt asked the Missouri 
Supreme Court to issue a writ of mandamus preventing the trial court from compel-
ling arbitration of the dispute.23 
The Missouri Supreme Court recognized that a writ of mandamus was the ap-
propriate mechanism to review whether a motion to compel arbitration was improp-
erly sustained.24  In order to qualify for a writ of mandamus, a litigant “must allege 
and prove that he has a clear, unequivocal, specific right to a thing claimed.”25  The 
court found the arbitration provisions within Hewitt’s contractual agreement were 
unconscionable as the NFL Commissioner controls every part of the process and 
there is no third party, independent review of his decisions.26  The Missouri Su-
preme Court, implying the specific terms of arbitration from applicable statutes in 
Missouri’s Uniform Arbitration Act (MUAA) then issued an order compelling ar-
bitration wherein the trial court appoints a neutral arbitrator.27 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. Standard of Review 
The Missouri Supreme Court can issue and determine original remedial writs, 
including writs of mandamus.28  A writ of mandamus is the proper way to review 
whether a motion to compel arbitration was improperly sustained.29  The Missouri 
Supreme Court will issue a writ of mandamus only when the party requesting the 
writ has a clear and unequivocal right to the relief requested.30 
                                                          
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id.  Several provisions of the arbitration agreement Hewitt argued interfered with his rights under 
the MHRA, barring arbitration under the “denial of statutory rights” doctrine.  Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Hewitt, 461 S.W. 3d at 804-05. 
 23. Id. at 805. 
 24. State ex rel. Vincent v. Schneider, 194 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Mo. 2006) (en banc). 
 25. Furlong Companies Inc. v. City of Kansas City, 189 S.W.3d 157, 166 (Mo. 2006) (en banc). 
 26. Hewitt, 461 S.W.3d at 813; Vincent, 194 S.W.3d 853 at 855-56. 
 27. Hewitt, 461 S.W.3d at 803. 
 28. Id. at 805 (Mo. 2015) (en banc); see MO. CONST. art. V, § 4.1. 
 29. Hewitt, 461 S.W.3d at 805; see Vincent, 194 S.W.3d at 856. 
 30. State ex rel. Jay Bee Stores, Inc. v. Edwards, 636 S.W.2d 61, 62 (Mo. 1982) (en banc). 
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B. Arbitration Agreement 
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) governs the applicability and enforceability 
of arbitration agreements in all contracts involving interstate commerce.31  The 
United States Supreme Court has held the FAA applies where an arbitration agree-
ment is executed in a single state by residents of that state as long as one of the 
parties in the agreement engages in business in multiple states.32  The FAA provides 
the four exclusive ways an arbitration award can be vacated, which has been upheld 
by the United States Supreme Court.33  Of these four ways, the one most applicable 
in Hewitt’s case involves evident partiality or corruption of the arbitrators.34 
The Court noted that while it is impractical to think that arbitrators cannot have 
any ties with the business world, arbitrators should face more scrutiny than judges 
when it comes to bias because arbitrators have complete freedom to decide the law 
and facts of the case without appellate review.35  Congress, which passed the FAA, 
did not intend to have litigants submit their cases to arbitrators that are biased to-
ward one party and favorable to the other.36  Thus, arbitrators should disclose any 
potential bias and should avoid the appearance of bias.37 
Evident partiality as a means for vacatur has been interpreted in different ways 
and no clear consensus exists at the federal level as to what evident partiality is and 
what information an arbitrator must disclose to the parties.38  Depending on the 
jurisdiction, each circuit has a different definition of evident impartiality that parties 
must be aware of when seeking to vacate arbitration. 
The Fifth Circuit adopted the rule that an award can be vacated only if there is 
more than a “trivial or insubstantial prior relationship between the arbitrator and the 
parties to the proceeding.”39  The court did not want to provide motivation for par-
ties to conduct rigorous, after-the-fact investigations to uncover very trivial rela-
tionships, most of which would not have been objected to if the disclosure had been 
made.40 
The First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have adopted a form of 
the “reasonable person” standard to determine evident partiality.41  The First Circuit 
defined evident partiality as a situation where a reasonable person would conclude 
that an arbitrator was partial to one party of the arbitration.42  Mere participation by 
the arbitrators and one of the parties in the same industry is not enough for a facial 
                                                          
 31. Hewitt, 461 S.W. 3d at 805; see 9 U.S.C. §1-15 (2012). 
 32. Hewitt, 461 S.W.3d at 805 (citing Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 57 (2003)). 
 33. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012); see Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 586 (2008); see 
also MO. REV. STAT. §435.405 (2000). 
 34. 9 U.S.C. § 10. 
 35. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968). 
 36. Id. at 150. 
 37. Id. at 149-150. 
 38. Hall St., 552 U.S. at 578 (holding that the statutory grounds are exclusive and cannot be supple-
mented by a contract). 
 39. Positive Software Sols., Inc. v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 476 F.3d 278, 283 (2007). 
 40. Id. at 285. 
 41. See e.g., JCI Comm. Inc. v. Int’l Bhd of Elec. Workers, Local 103, 324 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2003); 
Morelite Const. Corp. v. New York City Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79 (2nd Cir. 
1984); Consol. Coal Co. v. Local 1643, United Mine Workers of Am., 48 F.3d 125 (4th Cir. 1995); 
Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 429 F.3d 640 (6th Cir. 2005); Gianelli Money Purchase 
Plan & Trust v. ADM Inv. Sers., Inc., 146 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 42. JCI Comm., 324 F.3d at 51. 
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claim of evident partiality.43  Rather, there must be specific facts showing improper 
motives of the arbitrator.44  The Eleventh Circuit held that an arbitrator can not be 
guilty of evident partiality unless (1) the arbitrator has actual knowledge of an ex-
isting conflict or (2) the arbitrator knew information that would lead a reasonable 
person to believe a conflict could exist and failed to disclose it.45 
The Fourth Circuit devised a four-part test to define evident partiality.46  The 
first factor a court should consider is any personal interest, pecuniary or otherwise, 
the arbitrator has in the arbitration.47  Next, the court considers whether the direct-
ness of the relationship between the arbitrator and the party the arbitrator is alleged 
to favor.48  The third factor is the connection of the relationship to the arbitration.49  
Lastly, the court looks at the proximity in time between the relationship and the 
arbitration proceeding.50  These factors should be examined to determine whether 
the asserted bias is “direct, definite, and capable of demonstration rather than re-
mote, uncertain, or speculative.”51 
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit considers facts that indicate “improper motives 
on the part of the arbitrator,” but the party need not prove the arbitrator did indeed 
have improper motives, as this would make the standard for evident partiality the 
same as proving actual bias.52  The party seeking vacatur must put forward objective 
facts to demonstrate such a degree of partiality that a reasonable person would con-
clude the arbitrator had improper motives.53 
The Eighth Circuit, the jurisdiction in which Missouri is under, has yet to define 
evident partiality. The Eighth Circuit has shown that a business relationship be-
tween one party and the arbitrator would constitute evident partiality.54  Therefore, 
arbitrators should avoid the appearance of bias and must disclose to the parties any 
dealings that might create bias or an impression of it.55  Additionally, Missouri state 
courts have adopted their own standard for evident partiality; when the interest or 
bias of the arbitrator is direct, definite, and capable of demonstration56 and is not 
remote, uncertain, or speculative.57 
Missouri state courts can evaluate unconscionability claims, including arbitra-
tor bias claims, under state law in the context of contract formation.58  Courts look 
at the contract or arbitration agreement as a whole to see whether the agreement to 
arbitrate is valid.59  The doctrine of unconscionability gives courts the power to 
                                                          
 43. Id. at 52. 
 44. Id. at 51. 
 45. Gianelli Money, 146 F.3d at 1312. 
 46. Consolidated Coal, 48 F.3d at 130. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 129. 
 52. Consolidated Coal, 48 F.3d at 129. 
 53. ANR Coal Co., Inc. v. Cogentrix of North Carolina, Inc., 173 F.3d 494, 501 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 54. Olson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 51 F.3d 157, 159-60 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 55. See Montez v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 260 F.3d 980, 982 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 56. See Sheffield Assembly of God Church, Inc. v. Am. Ins. Co., 870 S.W.2d 926, 930 (Mo. Ct. App. 
W.D. 1994); Nat’l Ave. Bldg. Co. v. Stewart, 910 S.W.2d 334, 343 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 1995). 
 57. Sheffield Assembly of God Church, Inc. v. Am. Ins. Co., 870 S.W.2d 926, 930 (Mo. Ct. App. 
W.D. 1994). 
 58. State ex rel. Hewitt v. Kerr, 461 S.W.3d 798, 812-813 (Mo. 2015) (en banc); see Brewer v. Mo. 
Title Loans, 364 S.W.3d 486, 492 n.3 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
 59. State ex rel. Hewitt v. Kerr, 461 S.W. 3d 798, 812 (Mo. 2015) (en banc). 
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invalidate contracts if a party in the contract is subject to an absence of meaningful 
choice and unfairly oppressive terms.60  Under the NFL constitution and bylaws, 
the league or the team owners “shall select and employ” the Commissioner and set 
the Commissioner’s term of employment and compensation, thus the Missouri Su-
preme Court concluded that the Commissioner is employed by the team owners.61 
In a similar case to Hewitt involving a writ of mandamus and the compelling 
of arbitration, the Missouri Supreme Court found a clause in an arbitration contract 
between a home-builder and home purchasers that designated the president of a 
home-builders association as the sole selector of the arbitrator unconscionable be-
cause the president was “an individual in a position of bias.”62  Requiring an indi-
vidual in a position of bias to be the sole arbitrator or to be the sole selector of an 
unbiased arbitrator is unconscionable.63  Missouri Revised Statute § 435.360 reme-
dies this unconscionable portion of the arbitration provision by allowing the court 
to appoint one or more unbiased arbitrators.64 
C. Terms of Arbitration 
A valid arbitration clause in an employment contract requires mutuality of 
agreement and assent by the parties to the terms of the contract.65  To incorporate 
terms from another document, the contract must make clear reference to the other 
document and describe it so that the document’s identity can be ascertained beyond 
a doubt.66  A state determines the validity of an arbitration agreement by applying 
state contract law principles.67  This means a Missouri court can declare an arbitra-
tion agreement unenforceable if a generally applicable contract defense pertains to 
concerns raised about the agreement.68  The terms of a contract are read by the court 
holistically with terms interpreted under their plain meaning.69 
In many states, there are statutory provisions for enforcing arbitration agree-
ments by state courts.70  The Missouri General Assembly adopted the MUAA in 
1980.71  Prior to 1980, arbitration agreements, either written or oral, did not bar the 
filing of a lawsuit in Missouri.72  Today, when an arbitration agreement is valid but 
the arbitration provisions are silent or unconscionable as to certain essential matters 
regarding the arbitration, the failure or nonexistence of the terms is remedied by                                                           
 60. State ex rel. Vincent v. Schneider, 194 S.W.3d 853, 858 (Mo. 2006) (en banc). 
 61. Hewitt, 461 S.W. 3d at 813. 
 62. Id.; Vincent, 194 S.W.3d at 859. 
 63. Vincent, 194 S.W.3d at 859. 
 64. MO. REV. STAT. §435.360 (2000). “If the arbitration agreement provides a method of appointment 
of arbitrators, this method shall be followed.  In the absence thereof, or if the agreed method fails or for 
any reason cannot be followed… the court on application of a party shall appoint one or more arbitrators.  
An arbitrator so appointed has all the powers of one specifically named in the agreement.” Id. 
 65. Hewitt, 461 S.W.3d at 810 (Mo. 2015) (en banc); see Abrams v. Four Seasons Lakesites/Chase 
Resorts, Inc., 925 S.W.2d 932, 938 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 1996). 
 66. Hewitt, 461 S.W.3d at 810-811 (Mo. 2015) (en banc); see Intertel, Inc. v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. 
Servs., Inc., 204 S.W.3d 183, 196 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 2006). 
 67. Vincent, 194 S.W. 3d at 805; see Hewitt, 461 S.W.3d at 807. 
 68. Hewitt, 461 S.W.3d at 807; see also Robinson v. Title Lenders, Inc., 364 S.W.3d 505, 515 (Mo. 
2012) (en banc) (listing examples of contract defenses include fraud, duress, or unconscionability). 
 69. Hewitt, 461 S.W.3d at 808; see Dunn Indus. Grp., Inc. v. City of Sugar Creek, 112 S.W.3d 421, 
428 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). 
 70. Med. Shoppe Int’l, Inc. v. J-Pral Corp., 662 S.W.2d 263, 273-74 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). 
 71. Id. at 274. 
 72. Id. 
6
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2016, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 15
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2016/iss1/15
No. 1] The Latest NFL Fumble 235 
implied terms from statutes within the MUAA.73  The most significant change after 
the MUAA was enacted was the increased enforceability of agreements to arbi-
trate.74  The MUAA applies only to written agreements and gives guidelines for 
enforcing arbitration agreements by providing terms that can be read into arbitration 
agreements.75  For example, the MUAA allows for a substitution of a new arbitrator 
when the designated arbitrator is disqualified.76 
In Hojnowski v. Buffalo Bills, Inc., another former equipment manager of an 
NFL team challenged the arbitration clause of his employment contract when he 
filed a lawsuit in federal district court for age discrimination.77  Hojnowski’s em-
ployment contract contained a similarly worded arbitration clause to Hewitt’s and 
Hojnowski was not provided with the NFL procedural guidelines that govern arbi-
tration proceedings.78  Hewitt’s main argument for vacating the arbitration provi-
sion was that the agreement did not include the rules governing arbitration and did 
not explicitly reference these rules.79  Hojnowski was unaware he would be required 
to arbitrate employment related disputes with the NFL Commissioner serving as the 
arbitrator.80  The United States District Court for the Western District of New York 
rejected Hojnowski’s argument that the validity of an arbitration agreement re-
quired transparently stated arbitration guidelines.81  The court cautioned that the 
practice of not including arbitration guidelines in the arbitration provision of an 
employment contract was not advisable.82   However, the court still found the em-
ployment contract was a valid, enforceable contract, and that it “clearly and unmis-
takably” compelled Hojnowski to arbitrate all employment-related disputes.83 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
A. Majority Opinion 
On transfer from the Missouri Court of Appeals, five of the seven Missouri 
Supreme Court judges found no adequate remedy on appeal for the present claims.84  
Because Hewitt could not be compelled to arbitrate his claims using the NFL guide-
line terms with the Commissioner as the sole arbitrator, the court found that Hewitt                                                           
 73. Hewitt, 461 S.W.3d at 811; see also Triarch Indus v. Crabtree, 158 S.W.3d 772, 775 (Mo. 2005) 
(en banc); State ex rel. Vincent v. Schneider, 194 S.W.3d 853, 859-61 (Mo. 2006) (en banc). 
 74. MO. REV. STAT. §435.350 (2000). 
 75. Forest Hills Country Club v. Fred Weber, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1985). 
 76. Hewitt, 461 S.W.3d at 813; see MO.  REV. STAT. § 435.360 (2000). 
 77. Hojnowski v. Buffalo Bills, Inc., 995 F.Supp. 2d 232, 236-38 (W.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 78. Id.at 235. The arbitration clause provided: 
Employee agrees that all matters in dispute between Employee and Employer, including without 
limitation any dispute arising from the terms of this Agreement, shall be referred to the NFL Com-
missioner for binding arbitration, and his decision shall be accepted as final, complete, conclusive, 
binding, and unappealable by the Employee and Employer.  
Id. 
 79. Id. at 236. 
 80. Id. at 237. 
 81. Id. at 239-40. 
 82. Id. at 238. 
 83. Hojnowski, 995 F.Supp at 237. 
 84. State ex rel. Hewitt v. Kerr, 461 S.W.3d 798, 806 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (Breckenridge, Draper III, 
Stith, Russell, and Teitelman, JJ.). These judges found that “if Hewitt is not bound to arbitrate under the 
terms of his contract, this Court can readily avoid this duplicative and unnecessary additional litigation 
through a writ of mandamus.” Id. 
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had no adequate remedy on appeal and that a permanent writ of mandamus should 
be issued.85 
The court also found that the FAA governed Hewitt’s employment contract 
since the Rams operate in interstate commerce.86  Additionally, the court held that 
the arbitration agreement was supported by adequate consideration.87 
The majority found that Hewitt’s employment contract had a valid and enforce-
able arbitration clause compelling him to arbitrate disputes against the Rams.88  The 
arbitration provision in Hewitt’s employment contract provided that the Constitu-
tion and By-Laws and Rules and Regulations of the NFL would lead to final deci-
sions of the NFL Commissioner that would legally bind Hewitt.89 
Through the plain text of the agreement, the court found that Hewitt knew he 
was bound by the Constitution and By-Laws and Rules and Regulations of the NFL 
but that he was not aware of the full provisions of his employment contract because 
the contract neither mentioned the NFL procedural guidelines nor attached them.90  
Hewitt conceded his employment contract had an arbitration provision, and the trial 
court found an arbitration provision had been included in many of the previous em-
ployment contracts Hewitt had signed.91  The language in Hewitt’s contract pro-
vided that: 
The Rams and Hewitt . . . agree that in any dispute which may arise be-
tween them, the matter in dispute shall be referred to the Commissioner of 
the National Football League for decision and after due notice and hearing, 
at which both parties may appear, the decision of said Commissioner shall 
be final, binding, conclusive and unappealable. . . . . 92 
Thus, the majority found that the essential terms of the arbitration were not 
referenced in Hewitt’s employment contract and therefore were not incorporated.93 
Hewitt argued that the Commissioner could not be neutral or unbiased in a dis-
pute between an employee and team management because team owners select and 
determine the salary of the Commissioner.94  Within Hewitt’s contract, the plain 
language showed he intended to be legally bound by the constitution and bylaws of 
                                                          
 85. Id. at 815. 
 86. Id. at 805. (“[T]he team—its players and employees—participate in away games and take in rev-
enue in other states, and several of the defendant corporations named in this suit are incorporated in 
Delaware.”). 
 87. Id. at 809. 
 88. Id. at 803 (Breckenridge, Draper III, Stith, and Russell, JJ.).  Justice Teitelman wrote a dissenting 
opinion stating that Hewitt should not be compelled to arbitrate the underlying dispute, as there was no 
mutual agreement to the essential terms in this case.  Id. at 822. 
 89. Id. at 810 (quoting the Constitution and Bylaws of the NFL) (“The [NFL] Commissioner shall 
have full, complete, and final jurisdiction and authority to arbitrate [.] …  The Commissioner shall in-
terpret and from time to time establish policy and procedure in respect to the provisions of the Constitu-
tion and Bylaws and any enforcement thereof.). 
 90. Hewitt, 461 S.W. 3d at 811. 
 91. Id. at 808. 
 92. Id. at 812. 
 93. Id. at 803 (Breckenridge, Draper III, Russell, and Teitelman, JJ.). In dissent, Justice Stith, noted 
that no case had been cited requiring that the parties be given a copy of the relevant rules when they were 
otherwise accessible. Id. at 821 (citing Hojnowski v. Buffalo Bills, Inc., 995 F.Supp.2d 232, 236-38 
(W.D. N.Y. 2014)). 
 94. Id. at 812. 
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the NFL, which stated the NFL Commissioner is the sole arbitrator.95  Hewitt nei-
ther presented a question of fact as to the content of these provisions nor demon-
strated whether the provisions said that NFL teams must comply with their terms.96  
The agreement was supported by consideration and obligated both parties to arbi-
trate.97   The court further determined that Hewitt did not show that the circum-
stances under which the contract was entered into were so unconscionable as to 
render the agreement invalid.98  The court concluded that there was a valid and en-
forceable agreement to arbitrate.99  The agreement governed arbitration of any dis-
pute which may arise between Hewitt and the Rams, including statutory claims.100  
Therefore, even Hewitt’s claims under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA) 
could be arbitrated.101 
The majority also found that the NFL’s dispute resolution procedural guide-
lines setting out the essential terms of arbitration were not included in Hewitt’s em-
ployment contract and thus were not incorporated into his contract.102  Hewitt’s em-
ployment contract made no reference to the NFL guidelines, and the Constitution 
and By-Laws did not clearly reference the guidelines either.103  The contract only 
referred to the “Rules and Regulations of the National Football League,”104 and did 
not identify the guidelines so Hewitt could “ascertain beyond a doubt” what guide-
lines were incorporated into the agreement.105  Furthermore, the court held that 
Hewitt did not bear the responsibility of seeking out an unknown document not 
clearly identified in his employment contract or the constitution and bylaws.106  As 
such, Hewitt could not manifest his consent and did not assent to the essential terms 
of arbitration found in the guidelines.107 
However, the court found the agreement to arbitrate was valid because the plain 
language in the employment contract proved that Hewitt knew he was legally bound 
by the constitution and bylaws of the NFL, which provided that his disputes would 
be arbitrated.108  The court found Hewitt was unable to show the circumstances 
under which the contract was made were so unconscionable that the entire contract 
was invalid.109  Hewitt argued that the contract was presented without any discus-
sion about the contractual terms.110  The court found this was undermined by the 
fact that Hewitt had been an employee of the team for over 30 years, during which 
time the trial court found Hewitt had signed many employment contracts containing 
arbitration provisions substantially similar to the one in this case.111  The court 
                                                          
 95. Id. at 808. 
 96. Hewitt, 461 S.W.3d at 808. 
 97. Id. at 810. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 814. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Hewitt, 461 S.W.3d at 803 (Breckenridge, Draper III, Russell, and Teitelman, JJ.). 
 103. Id. at 811. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 810; see Intertel, Inc. v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 204 S.W.3d 183, 196 (Mo. 
Ct. App. E.D. 2006). 
 106. Hewitt, 461 S.W.3d at 811. 
 107. Id. at 810. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 809. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
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agreed with the trial court that if Hewitt did not read his contract, ask about the 
terms within it, or obtain supporting documents during his tenure with the Rams, 
the court could not turn back time and protect him against his contractual prom-
ises.112  Therefore, the court found the arbitration agreement was not procedurally 
unconscionable.113 
The majority found that the terms of the contract designating the NFL Com-
missioner, an employee of the team owners, as the sole arbitrator with autonomous 
discretion to create arbitration rules was unconscionable and therefore unenforcea-
ble.114  Like the president of the home-builders association in Vincent, the Missouri 
Supreme Court found the NFL Commissioner was “an individual in a position of 
bias as the arbitrator,” because NFL Commissioner has an implicit bias due to his 
employment by the NFL and its affiliates.115  Furthermore, the Commissioner is not 
only the arbitrator but also the person controlling almost every aspect of the arbi-
tration from the rules and procedures to the final decision.116  The court found these 
provisions within the arbitration agreement were unconscionable as there was no 
independent third party review of his decisions.117 
The majority further found that the MUAA provides a mechanism to infer miss-
ing terms from the arbitration agreement and gives guidelines for appointing an 
arbitrator to replace the NFL Commissioner.118  As such, four judges issued a per-
manent writ of mandamus, directing the trial court to vacate its order granting the 
motion to compel arbitration and to issue an order compelling arbitration with a 
neutral arbitrator, inferring the specific terms of the arbitration from applicable stat-
utes in the MUAA.119 
B. Judge Stith’s Dissenting Opinion 
Judge Stith concurred with the majority in part and dissented in part.  Judge 
Stith concurred with the majority’s holding that a writ of mandamus was the appro-
priate way to review a trial court decision for error in sustaining a motion to compel 
arbitration and that the arbitration agreement in this case was valid.120  Judge Stith 
did not agree with the majority’s belief that the NFL Commissioner was presump-
tively biased.121  The majority opinion in this case was the first decision in the 
United States that held the NFL Commissioner, as an employee of the various NFL 
teams, could not be unbiased in a dispute between an employee and an NFL team.122  
                                                          
 112. Hewitt, 461 S.W.3d at 809. 
 113. Id. at 810. Justice Wilson dissented on these grounds pointing out that the Court ordered Hewitt 
to participate in the very thing he asked the Court to stop, specifically, his arbitration.  Id. at 829. 
 114. Id. at 803 (Breckenridge, Draper III, Russell, and Teitelman, JJ.). 
 115. Id. at 813. 
 116. Id. at 813; see NFL CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS, supra note 3, at 28. 
 117. Hewitt, 461 S.W.3d at 813; State ex rel. Vincent v. Schneider, 194 S.W.3d 853, 859 (Mo. 2006) 
(en banc). 
 118. Hewitt, 461 S.W.3d at 803 (Breckenridge, Draper III, Russell, and Stith, JJ.). 
 119. Id. Because there was not mutual agreement to the essential terms, Justice Teitelman dissented 
and held there was not an enforceable contract and therefore Hewitt was not compelled to arbitrate.  Id. 
at 822. 
 120. Id. at 816. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 817. 
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The Missouri Supreme Court held this, “simply on the fact that the NFL Commis-
sioner is, well, the NFL Commissioner.”123  In each case where a party has sought 
disqualification of the NFL Commissioner because of his position, the disqualifica-
tion request was denied—until now.124  Actual bias or a conflict of interest had al-
ways been required.125 
Furthermore, Judge Stith believed the NFL Commissioner did not exclusively 
represent the interests of the team owners.126  The NFL requires the NFL Commis-
sioner to have “unquestioned integrity” and no financial interest, direct or indirect, 
in any professional sport.127  Furthermore, Judge Stith noted that Hewitt offered 
only speculation and cited no evidence of bias against employees or legal authority 
for his claim that the NFL Commissioner was inherently biased or had exhibited 
bias based solely on the Commissioner’s position as Commissioner.128  Therefore, 
Judge Stith rejected this claim of bias.129 
V. COMMENT 
The FAA and the U.S. Supreme Court have provided that there are four exclu-
sive ways to vacate arbitration decisions.130 The most prevalent in this case involves 
evident partiality or corrupt arbitrators.131  The majority in Hewitt determined that 
the NFL Commissioner was inherently biased and therefore had evident partiality 
because he was employed directly by one of the parties in the dispute.132  Because 
the NFL team owners give the NFL Commissioner the rules, his pay, and the po-
tential for contract renewal or termination, it is very unlikely that the Commissioner 
will exercise his powers impartially.133  Other professional sports leagues have com-
batted this evident partiality by hiring independent arbitrators.  The NFL should 
adopt this system. 
A. NFL Commissioner Bias 
The majority opinion of the Missouri Supreme Court in Hewitt was correct in 
determining that the NFL Commissioner has an inherent, unavoidable bias and 
therefore should not arbitrate disputes.  The majority further found the terms of the 
contract designating the NFL Commissioner, an employee of the team owners, as 
                                                          
 123. Id. 
 124. Hewitt, 461 S.W.3d at 817; see Alexander v. Minnesota Vikings Football Club LLC, 649 N.W.2d 
464, 467 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (finding that the FAA does not expressly provide for the pre-award 
removal of an arbitrator and thus the Court declined to find the Commissioner to be a biased arbitrator). 
 125. Hewitt, 461 S.W. 3d at 818-819. 
 126. Id. at 818. 
 127. Id. at 818; see NFL CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS, supra note 3, at 28. 
 128. Hewitt, 461 S.W. 3d at 819. 
 129. Id. 
 130. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012); see MO. REV. STAT. §435.405 (2000); see also Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. 
Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008) (holding the statutory grounds are exclusive and cannot be supple-
mented by a contract). 
 131. 9 U.S.C. § 10. The other three reasons are when the award is done through corruption, fraud, or 
undue means; the arbitrator is guilty of misconduct like refusing to hear evidence; or where the arbitra-
tors exceeded their powers.  Id. 
 132. Hewitt, 461 S.W.3d at 813. 
 133. See generally, NFL CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS, supra note 3, at 28 & 48. 
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the sole arbitrator with autonomous discretion to create arbitration rules was uncon-
scionable and therefore unenforceable.134  In her dissent, Judge Stith incorrectly 
believed this was not a presumptive bias.135  The NFL team owners pay the Com-
missioner,136 and in 2012, team owners decided to extend Commissioner Roger 
Goodell’s contract until 2018.137  Goodell, in his capacity as the Commissioner and 
arbitrator, has direct, definite, and demonstrable bias.  His salary comes directly 
from the teams and thus, creates a bias, as he would be more likely to find in favor 
of those who pay him.  Furthermore, the team owners have favored Goodell by 
renewing his contract. 
The only restriction the NFL imposes on the Commissioner to eliminate bias is 
that he cannot have a direct or indirect financial interest in any professional sport.138  
This is not enough.  The principal flaw in allowing the NFL Commissioner to decide 
employee and player disputes with management is that the Commissioner is natu-
rally partial toward management.  The NFL Commissioner is not a neutral third 
party.  His employers, the NFL team owners, appoint him; and therefore the Com-
missioner is implicitly subject to control by them.139  Not only does the NFL Com-
missioner’s pay come from the team owners, but the team owners also adopt the 
rules and regulations under which he operates.140  These same owners will eventu-
ally consider renewing the Commissioner’s contract.141  Right after the NFL estab-
lished these rules and regulations, the NFL then gave the Commissioner power to 
arbitrate all claims.142  Because the NFL and NFL teams owners issue the Commis-
sioner’s salary, establish the rules under which he operates, and hold the power over 
his contract renewal or termination, it is very unlikely that the Commissioner will 
exercise his powers impartially.  Rather, the NFL Commissioner is capable of 
demonstrating bias against players and employees of the team owners, and the Com-
missioner has an appearance of bias toward NFL team owners. 
The present system further encourages partiality to management because the 
current system allows the Commissioner to decide matters in which his own author-
ity or actions are questioned.  The Commissioner not only promulgates rules but 
also determines the outcomes of disputes between player conduct and personnel 
procedures.143  The Commissioner also rules on the validity of disciplinary actions 
that he imposed as the Commissioner.144  Within this system of no review, a Com-
                                                          
 134. Hewitt, 461 S.W.3d at 803. 
 135. Id. at 816. 
 136. NFL teams extend Goodell’s contract through 2018 season, NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE (Jan. 25, 
2012), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d826501f0/printable/nfl-teams-extend-goodells-con-
tract-through-2018-season.  All NFL clubs pay the Commissioner’s salary.  However, there are only six 
team owners on the NFL Compensation Committee.  All team owners must approve the NFL Compen-
sation Committee’s recommendation. 
 137. Id. 
 138. NFL CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS, supra note 3, at 28. 
 139. League Governance, NFL OPS., (2015), http://operations.nfl.com/football-ops/league-govern-
ance/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2016) (noting that the NFL Commissioner is responsible to the owners and 
an executive committee vote has the power to remove him). As an observation, male pronouns are used 
for the NFL Commissioner because only men have ever held the role of the Commissioner. 
 140. NFL CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS, supra note 3, at 48 (stating that playing rules are amended or 
changed by affirmative vote of at least three-fourths or 21 members of the League). 
 141. Id. at 28. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 28-29. 
 144. Id. at 33. 
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missioner can promulgate a rule and later, while arbitrating a claim, have to deter-
mine whether or not he had the authority to promulgate that rule.145  Since the Com-
missioner has unilateral power to interpret the rules and decisions he issues, the 
NFL dispute resolution system has an enormous potential for unfair decision-mak-
ing and allows direct, definite, and capable-of-demonstration bias into the arbitra-
tion process.  The Commissioner acts not only as the judge, jury, and executioner, 
but also as lead investigator, prosecutor, and the court of appeals.146  Additionally, 
the system gives the appearance of bias, which is unacceptable under the Missouri 
interpretation of inherent bias in the MUAA. 
B. Future Recommendations 
When the NFL player and employee unions renegotiate their contracts with the 
NFL, the arbitration provision, specifically as it provides for the NFL Commis-
sioner as the sole arbitrator of employee and player disputes, should be removed.  
Several other professional sports leagues in the United States have done this and 
have been successful.  Major League Baseball (MLB), the National Basketball As-
sociation (NBA), and the National Hockey League (NHL) all use an independent 
arbitration process.  
In 1921, the MLB created the office of the Commissioner through the Major 
League Agreement (MLA).147  The role of MLB Commissioner was created in part 
because of alleged gambling problems that were hurting the image of the game.148  
As his first act in office, Commissioner Kenesaw Landis, a former federal judge, 
banned Chicago White Sox players from playing baseball for life because of alle-
gations that they threw the 1919 World Series, despite the players having been ac-
quitted by a jury for conspiring to defraud the public by throwing the 1919 World 
Series.149  When these players challenged whether the MLB Commissioner should 
have this much power, the court found the Commissioner’s wide-ranging discretion 
valid under the MLA.150  Within the MLA, the parties gave the Commissioner con-
siderable authority and discretion to hear cases and to use his own initiative to ob-
serve, investigate, and take action to ensure the provisions of the agreement were 
followed and to prevent conduct detrimental to the sport.151  Under the current MLA 
enacted in 2012, the MLB Commissioner may bring sanctions against players and 
other employees if their conduct is not in the best interest of the league.152  As stated 
before, the current MLA outlines the disciplinary structure and procedures in the 
                                                          
 145. Id. at 29-32. 
 146. H. Brian Holland, Deflategate: Does The NFL Commissioner Enjoy Absolute Power?, NEWSWEEK 
(Aug. 20, 2015, 11:59 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/deflategate-does-nfl-commissioner-enjoy-ab-
solute-power-364565. 
 147. Robert Ambrose, Note, The NFL Makes It Rain: Through Strict Enforcement of Its Conduct Pol-
icy, the NFL Protects Its Integrity, Wealth, and Popularity, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1069, 1080 
(2008) (discussing the shaping of the MLB Commissioner’s authority and the appointment of Landis as 
the first Commissioner). 
 148. Id. 
 149. SportsCenter Flashback: The Chicago Black Sox Banned From Baseball, ESPN CLASSIC (Nov. 
19, 2003), http://espn.go.com/classic/s/black_sox_ moments.html (noting that Commissioner Kenesaw 
Landis banned the players two months into his term as the MLB Commissioner). 
 150. Milwaukee Am. Ass’n v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298, 301 (N.D. Ill. 1931). 
 151. Id. 
 152. 2012-2016 Basic Agreement, MLB 49 (2012) http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba_english.pdf. 
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league.153  Article XII of the agreement states that a player’s team, the vice president 
of on-field operations, or the Commissioner can discipline a player for “just 
cause.”154  This “just cause” requirement standard mandates that the discipline must 
reasonably commensurate with the offensive conduct.155 
Once a valid party, like the Commissioner, disciplines a player, the player can 
use the multi-step grievance procedure outlined in Article XI to appeal the discipli-
nary decision if the player feels the decision was improper.156  This process includes 
an independent arbitration if the initial steps of the procedure do not lead to settle-
ment.157  The MLB Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) employs one impartial 
arbitrator or a panel of three arbitrators, two of which are chosen by the parties.158   
If the parties disagree on an arbitrator, the American Arbitration Association pro-
vides a list from which the parties can choose an arbitrator.159 
The only way a player cannot file a grievance under Article XI is if the action 
taken by the Commissioner involves “the preservation of the integrity of, or the 
maintenance of public confidence in, the game of baseball.”160  This determination 
involving the integrity of baseball can occur at any point during the process.161  If 
this occurs, the Commissioner will issue a decision that constitutes a “full, final, 
and complete” disposition of the complaint.162  Thus, in most instances, an arbitrator 
may limit the MLB Commissioner’s disciplinary authority.163 
In contrast, the NFL Commissioner not only sanctions players but also handles 
all appeals of sanctions issued by him.164  Furthermore, Hewitt’s claim of alleged 
age discrimination has nothing to do with the preservation of the integrity of football 
or the maintenance of public confidence in football.  The MLB policy of securing 
an independent arbitrator for disputes not pertaining to the integrity of the game 
ensures fairness and equity within the arbitration process and thereby prevents evi-
dent partiality in arbitration decisions. 
The NBA Uniform Player Contract (UPC) outlines permissible player con-
duct.165  The UPC requires a player to refrain from doing anything materially detri-
mental or prejudicial to the best interests of the NBA or an NBA team.166  Among 
other infractions, if a player makes or endorses any statement or acts in a way det-
                                                          
 153. Id. at 48. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 38. 
 157. Id. at 41. 
 158. 2012-2016 Basic Agreement, supra note 152, at 41. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 39. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. David Waldstein, In Baseball vs. Rodriguez, a Show of Tough Posturing, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/31/sports/baseball/in-baseball-vs-rodriguez-a-show-of-tough-
posturing.html?_r=0. In this article, the author noted this clause is “rarely used” and “the players asso-
ciation has long maintained that the clause relates only to gambling, and contends that all commissioners 
since the union’s inception have agreed in writing not to apply it in other cases.”  Id. 
 164. Colin J. Daniels & Aaron Brooks, From the Black Sox to the Sky Box: The Evolution and Mechan-
ics of Commissioner Authority, 10 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 23, 31 (2008). 
 165. NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, NAT’L BASKETBALL PLAYERS ASS’N 79 (December 
2011), http://nbpa.com/cba/. 
 166. Id. at 385. 
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rimental to the best interests of the NBA, the player can be subject to a Commis-
sioner-imposed fine or suspension.167  However, all disciplinary decisions of the 
Commissioner are subject to review by the Board of Governors and can be appealed 
under the grievance and arbitration procedure of the NBA CBA.168  To file a formal 
grievance, a player must submit a timely statement of the issues.169  Both parties 
must then agree on a grievance arbitrator, and either party retains the ability to dis-
charge that arbitrator.170  If the parties cannot jointly agree on an arbitrator, the par-
ties must jointly request from the International Institute for Conflict Prevention and 
Resolution a list of 11 attorneys.171  To be eligible, these attorneys, and their law 
firms, cannot have represented within the past five years “any professional athletes; 
agents or other representatives of professional athletes; sports leagues, governing 
bodies, or their affiliates; sports teams or their affiliates; or owners in any profes-
sional sport.”172   The grievance arbitrator will hear the dispute and issue an 
award.173 
Much like the MLB, the NBA has certain limits to its grievance process.  If the 
NBA Commissioner’s decision concerns the integrity of the game and has a finan-
cial impact of $50,000 or less, the appeal must be made to the Commissioner.174  If 
the financial impact of the discipline is more than $50,000, the player can bring an 
appeal before the grievance arbitrator.175  The arbitrator will then apply an “arbitrary 
and capricious” standard of review to the Commissioner’s decision.176  As such, 
having an independent arbitrator picked from an international institute prevents bias 
and evident partiality from infiltrating the arbitration process. 
The NHL uses a different discipline system than other professional sports 
leagues. A hockey player may face discipline by his club for violations of club rules 
if the rules are reasonable and if the players receive proper notice of the rules.177  
The only articulated limit on these rules is that a player may not be fined for “indif-
ferent play.”178 
The Commissioner of the NHL can immediately expel a player for throwing a 
game or failing to report a solicitation to throw a game.179  The Commissioner can 
                                                          
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 306. 
 169. Id. at 307. 
 170. Id. at 313. 
 171. NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 165, at 313. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 312. 
 174. Id. at 314-15. 
 175. Id. at 317. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Collective Bargaining Agreement Between National Hockey League and National Hockey League 
Players’ Association, NAT’L HOCKEY LEAGUE 171 (2013) 
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 178. Id.  See N.H.L. CONSTITUTION & BY-LAW § 17 (2013) http://democrats.judici-
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also fine, suspend, or expel a player for acting in a way that is “dishonorable, prej-
udicial to or against the welfare of the League or the game of hockey.”180  Discipli-
nary grievances are separated into two categories in the NHL: on-ice and off-ice.181  
Unresolved grievances regarding discipline and disputes about an interpretation of 
club rules or the CBA go before an independent arbitrator.182  Both parties must 
agree on which independent arbitrator to appoint.183  Disputes regarding the severity 
of the discipline or the interpretation of the standard player contract go before the 
Commissioner to arbitrate.184  However, if the discipline ordered by the Commis-
sioner is suspension for six or more NHL games, the suspended player has a right 
to appeal to a Neutral Discipline Arbitrator.185  An appeal made to an NDA is done 
on an expedited basis and the NDA issues a final and binding opinion and award as 
soon as practically possible.186 
As evidenced, arbitration is the final step in a grievance procedure that is often 
governed by a CBA.  The MLB, NBA, and NHL Commissioners have an impartial 
and neutral arbitration system as their Commissioners’ broad disciplinary authority 
is still subject to an independent arbitrator review.  Currently, the NFL has no inde-
pendent arbitration process and no chance to appeal to an independent arbitrator.  If 
the NFL were to follow other professional sports leagues such as the MLB, NFL, 
or NHL, there would be less of an inherent bias in the arbitrator’s decisions because 
the arbitrators would be independent.  If the NFL used independent arbitrators, 
fewer violations of arbitration principles outlined in U.S. Code Title 9, § 10 would 
result because the Commissioner would not have excessive authority.  Furthermore, 
if the NFL adopted a policy like the NBA, in which the arbitrator cannot have had 
a tie to any element of professional sports within the past five years, it would pre-
vent biased decisions. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Centralized authority in a role like the NFL Commissioner can have several 
advantages.  However, these advantages should be balanced against the disad-
vantages of such a system.  As the current system stands, the advantages do not 
outweigh the interference with the rights of the players and employees that the cur-
rent system permits, as demonstrated in Hewitt.  The lack of an effective appeal 
procedure and the unilateral settlement of disputes imposed by the Commissioner 
all point to the need for change.  The Missouri Supreme Court took the correct first 
step by finding that the NFL Commissioner was indeed biased and therefore it was 
unconscionable to have him as an arbitrator.  Other states should follow this prece-
dent, and the NFL Player’s Association and the NFL should completely remove 
these arbitration provisions in the next collective bargaining agreement. 
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